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Judgmental Heuristics and News
Reporting
Sharon Dunwoody and Robert J. Griffin

A kind of cultural folklore has grown up around the practice of news
reporting to explain how journalists do their job. It's a vibrant and enduring set of stories, spurred largely by the intersection of two factors.
One is that, although news products are ubiquitous features of the culturallandscape, the processes that underlie these products are hidden
from the users. Despite the fact that viewers can often see the newsroom
looming behind well-groomed anchor peopleduringTV newscasts, they
are never permitted to see news actually being constructed. The second
is that our culture (as well as others) regards the effects of media messages as both powerful and problematic. That is, we are much more
likely to worry about the negative impacts of media messages than to
celebrate the positive ones. Legends build rapidly around any process
that combines mystery with the potential for evil.
These folkloric explanations are summoned to provide reasons for
what people see when they attend to news. More specifically, they serve
to rationalize people's perceptions that their media diet is awash in
flawed accounts. Here are a few of the explanations that we hear from
friends and family:
• Generating the largest audience possible is the primary goal of a
journalist, and he or she will accomplish this by selecting stories
that pander to the "lowest common denominator."
• Entertaining is more important than educating, so journalists
will "sensationalize" information with few moral qualms.
• Social responsibility will always play second fiddle to the economic bottom line; journalists are out to "sell newspapers," not
to provide a public service.
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Like all folklore, these tales contain bits of truth. But they offer a very
blunt instrument with which to trace the contours of news judgment
and practice. Put another way, they don't explain much of the variance in what we see in o~ daily newspapers or on our television news
programs.
In this chapter, we offer another set of tools that we think does a much
better job of accounting for variance in news making. Our argument is
that any single n~ws story is the product of a host of small, individuallevel decisions: selecting a story topic, choosing the story angle, deciding
who will serve as a source, making sense of the streams of information
that come the reporter 's way. Further, we argue that the occupation of
journalism employs some standardized strategies to make those decisions, judgmental shortcuts that closely resemble the heuristics used by
most individuals to negotiate daily life. Permit us to emphasize this last
point: These heuristics are not unique to the news business; rather, journalistic practice reinforces reporters and editors 10r using heuristics that
are integral to problem solving for all of us, for better or worse. In the
course of this chapter, we will discuss some of these heuristic devices
and will offer a case study from the realm of environmental reporting
to illustrate our points. Finally, we will speculate about the potential
effects of such heuristic decision making on news and, ultimately, on
the audiences for news products.
.
A Couple of Caveats
The reader should be aware that, although we will rarely use the term
behavioral decision theory in this chapter, our focus on heuristic decision
making places us squarely within that psychological domain. Where
we may depart from some of our colleagues is that we do not, a priori,
define heuristic decision making as necessarily deficient or irrational.
Heuristic decisions are indeed superficial ones, as they rely on assessing
only one or a handful of variables in a multivariate environment. But
if an individual selects an important subset of variables on which to
ground his or her decision, that may produce a respectable outcome
most of the time. The heuristics promoted by journalism are often so
grounded. And although journalists may utilize evidentiary strategies
that occasionally make systematic analysts wince, their ways of making
sense of the world resonate strongly with those of their audiences. One
explanation of the power of the media, in fact, may be that mass media
accounts amplify - rather than contradict - cultural sense-making.
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This position is consonant with tha t of scholars of judgment and
decision making who have followed on the heels of economist Herbert
Simon (1982), who posits that individuals make judgments through a
process of satisficing, that is, by selecting the first reasonable course of
action instead of evaluating a larger set of options more systematically.
Such a strategy is an adaptation, argues Simon, both to one's cognitive
abilities and to the environment in which a given decision must be made.
And it's an adaptation that suffices in most instances.
The psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer has built on Simon 's work. He
suggests that one-reason decision making, although indeed violating the
tenets of classical rationality, is effective. 1n one recent stud y, Gigerenzer
and Goldstein (1996) held a computer-simulation competition between
one-reason decision making and more effortfu] inference procedures
and found that the former consistently matched or outperformed the
latter.
A final word of caution: Although this chapter will dwell on psychological processes, it will be important for the reader to resist concluding
that one can account for 100% of the variance in news making at this
level. Studies of journalistiC work over the decades have found importantdeterminants at the cultural (Coleman, 1995; Glasser & Ettema, 1989;
Silverstone, 1985), occupational/professional (Dunwoody and Griffin,
1993; Fishman, 1980; McManus, 1991; Tuchman, 1978), and organizational (Breed, 1955; Dunwoody, 1979; Soloski, 1989) levels. 1n fact, our
argument in this chapter is, in part, that the occlIpation of journalism
works to privilege some judgmental shortcuts over others. Like all individuals, reporters are creatures of their social environment. Our job in
this chapter is not to ignore the impact of that environment but rather
to examine the influence of judgmental h euristics as they are brought
into play within those sociocultural and organizational boundaries.
Journalistic Judgments
Journalistic work is characterized by speed, particularly in the world
of daily news gathering. Products must emerge daily, even hourly; it
is inconceivable to decide to skip, say, the Wednesday issue of a daily
newspaper because reporters need more time to report complex stories.
And new channels such as the World Wide Web are, if anything, ratcheting up the need for speed. An Internet n ews site may be updated on
a minute-by-minute basis, raising legitimate questions about the social
value of raw information.
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In a world of rapidly recurring deadlines, journalists cannot afford
to engage in systematic information processing. Instead, the occupation rewards those who can make quick decisions about "what's news"
and decide rapidly how to cobble together a story. Extremely fast decisions are, perforce, heuristic ones. Thus, journalism is unapologetically
a world of heuristic decision making.
To accomplish its work, journalism employs the kinds of judgmental shortcuts used in other walks of life; it has not constructed unique
heuristics or even necessarily improved on existing ones. Part of the
reason for the use of "mainstream" shortcuts is that the occupation has
historically resisted the notion that one needs specialized training to become a journalist. Individuals are welcomed into the occupation from
a variety of backgrounds, making it necessary for them to rely on a
common subset of heuristics.
But perhaps more importantly, stories that employ the kinds of heuristic decision making likely to be used by members of the audience get a
sympathetic reading from that audience. Readers may immediately see
the relevance of vivid anecdotal information in a story and thus be more
likely to learn from such information than from more systematic - but
more pallid - evidence. Perversely, journalists may be most effective in
influencing audiences when they employ the kinds of heuristic strategies that may be least effective in producing high-quality informatiori.
,A lthough there are many ways to categorize heuristic decision making, we will divide the heuristics used by journalists into two groupsthose employed in topic selection and those used to make decisions
about evidence in the course of reporting and writing a story. In the
following sections, we provide examples from each category.
What's Nws?

Although news is a reconstruction - not a reflection - of reality, journalists rely heavily on environmental cues to signal when news is occurring. A journalist cannot create a topic from whole cloth; reporters
who make up events or who interview nonexistent sources run afoul of
their employers if discovered. (For the account of one promising young
joumalist who met his end by fabricating, see Bissinger, 1998.) Thus,
joumalists must monitor events and processes around them and select
from those myriad possibilities a small subset of happenings to define as
"news." Given the welter of possible news cues, reporters are quickly socialized to attend to a subset. Here are three of the more important cues:
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Journalists Pay Attention When Things Go Wrong, Not When Things Go
Right. The folkloric version of this heuristic is that journalists emphasize

the negative, not the positive. And indeed, the typical daily newspaper
or TV news report d oes seem to wallow in accounts of things going
awry. A scientist whose fraudulent behavior is revealed will get much
more press than one who plays by the rules. A convicted felon who,
upon release from prison, commits another crime will get far more attention than will the former criminal who lives a respectable life after
release.
Although individuals in our society routinely disparage this journalistic emphasis on the negative, it is a popular mainstream heuristic
(Shoemaker, 1996). We all attend more closely to aberrant, usually negative happenings than to ordinary events in our environment. These negative occurrences are so salient that we routinely assign them a greater
weight than we do p ositive ones. Slovic and colleagues have found that
when people confront an array of evidence in the course of making a
decision, a positive attribute does not count as much as a negative one
(Slovic, 1992). In trying to decide how to react to a novel technology, for
example, the presence of a small likelihood of coming to harm (negative) may outweigh numerous proposed benefits, leading an individual
to reject the technology.
Another acknowledgment of the social importance of this heuristic
is people's tendency to use the mass media as a surveillance device,
as a way of keeping track of events in their environment (Shoemaker,
1996). It is apparently far more important to spot catastrophe looming
than it is to be reminded of social regularity. Thus, the mass media
typically characterize their societal role as that of serving as society's
watchdog. That they honor this role more in the breach than in daily
practice (see, e.g., Donohue, Tichenor, & Olien, 1995) does not detract
from its importance as an occupational or cultural norm.
Events Are More Newsworthy ThaI! Processes. The world of deadlines

presents journalists with a major interpretive challenge. How does one
give meaning to long-running natural and social processes, the warp
and woof of daily life, when the goal is to produce independent dollops
of information - stories - on a weekly, daily, or hourly basis? Sociologist Gaye Tuchman responds that journalism has established routines
to help it antiCipate, categorize, and package these processes. The result is a reconceptualization of the process as a series of discrete events.

Says Tuchman, "The way in which n ewsmen classify events-as-news
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decreases the variability of the raw material processed by news organizations and facilitates routinization" (1997, p . 174).
The event is a ubiquitous feature of the news, so much so that sources
have learned to stage events - press conferences, meetings, ceremonies
of all kinds - to increase their public visibility. Journalists grumble about
such overt management attempts but turn them into stories anyway. For
example, even though the Los Angeles Times science writing staff reacted
skeptically when the University of Utah arranged a press conference in
1989 to herald the achievement of room-temperature fusion, the newspaper covered the event. Noted science editor Joel Greenberg:
It seemed like a textbook case of a story to avoid. The claim, particularly using
such a technique, seemed fantastic. The research paper had yet to be published
in a refereed journal. And no one at Princeton or anywhere else where fusion

research had been pursued for many years had come close to such a result. Most
science writers knew this was a sensational story that almost certainly would

prove to be not true, at least not to the point of thE! university's claims.
Nevertheless, the results emanated from a respected university and from two
scientists . .. who, as far as anyone could tell, were legitimate members of the
research community. And finally, whether we covered it or not, it was obvious

that this was a story destined to lead the television news and make the covers
of Time and Newsweek (which it did). To ignore it would have been a mistake.
.
(Greenberg, 1997, p. 100)
Reinterpreting a process as a cascade of events is a spectacularly
successful heuristic device. It allows journalists to survey their terrain
rapidly for event markers and to prioritize those markers by some criterion for importance. Events have easily discernible beginnings and endings, simplifying the construction of narratives. Events' ready availability in the environment encourages both journalists and society to interpret journalistic work as the process of mirroring - not reconstructingreality. And, as with so many of the heuristics employed by journalists, this preference for events is shared by audiences, who also find
it much easier to grapple with concrete happenings than with diffuse
processes.
But the debits of this heuristic are substantial. The notion that events
are features of the landscape that can readily be seen and selected forces
journalists to ignore great swaths of process that cannot be easily packaged in event narratives. Journalists' failure to represent abstract concepts and linkages in their stories leads some critics to argue that journalistic training robs reporters of the ability to think conceptually. Reporters
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"do not conceptualize their own experience or place particular, concrete facts into broader theoretical frameworks, " argues one such critic.
"Journalists are nontheoretic knowers who depend upon instinctive,
concrete, first-hand 'acquaintance with' events, not formal, systematic
'knowledge about'events" (Phillips 1977, p . 70).
Equally problematic, reliance on events discernible in the environment promotes a kind of journalistic reactivity that allows sources much
greater control OVer what becomes news than they otherwise might
have. McManus (1994) and others find that only a fraction of daily news
stories can be traced back to journalistic efforts to conceptualize and
write independently about issues and problems, a process called enterprise reporting in the business. Rather, the bulk of a day's news depends
heavily on the flow of information into the newsroom, much of that
information packaged by sources specifically to gain the attention of
reporters and editors.

News Values. Journalists are routinely confronted by too much news.
Put another way, of the vast array of happenings in the environment
available to a journalist on a given day, most must be set aside. And that
decision must be made in a matter of seconds. There is simply no time
for thoughtful deliberation, for extended discussions with journalistic
colleagues about how to approach an issue or about whether a particular
topiC warrants coverage. Editors and subeditors will engage in regular
story conferences, but discussions there focus less on what to cover and
more on such production issues as where in a newspaper or newscast
to situate a story.
The speed with which news selections are made requires journalists
to employ a set of heuristic judgments to categorize the world around
them. Called news values, these judgments are usually unspoken, operating at an almost unconscious level. But they are reinforced at all levels,
from journalism classrooms in universities to the newsroom itself. What
are these criteria tha t allow a thin trickle of informa tion through the news
"gate" while keeping much of the rest of the world at bay? Here are a
few of those values:
• Size matters. Large-scale happenings are much more likely to
be noticed and covered than are small-scale happenings. In a
recent study of media coverage of environmental hazards, for
example, Freudenburg and colleagues (1996) found that the best
predictor of media attention was magnitude: the number of
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casualties or the level of damage caused by the hazard. Below
a certain size threshold, events were essentially invisible .
• The closer, the better. Given two similar events, the more geographically proximate one will get far more media attention
than the more elistant event. And more proximate sources will
be preferred to more elistant ones. This focus on proximity helps
illuminate a number of otherwise puzzling patterns - 'for example, the tendency of a reporter attending an international meeting or a national political convention to cover the speeches and
comments of the hometown delegates, often to the exclusion of
more visible, more impactful sources .
• Once a topic has become news, it tends to remain newsworthy.
That is, once a story has crossed the news threshold, subsequent,
related events are mudl more likely to be defined as newsworthy regardless of their relative importance at the time. To return
to the cold fusion story by way of example, once the University
of Utah press conference had put the topic on the national - nay,
international - news agenda, reporters returned to it time and
time again, despite the fact that cold fusion was never demonstrated to occur in a laboratory.
News criteria have been the subject of much study over the years,
with results generally supporting the ubiquity of these heuristic devices
across time, across countries, and across types of media organizations.
Frequency of production is a major predictor of news criteria use: The
more frequently you publish, the more likely you are to utilize these
judgmental shortcuts. One of the more seminal studies, by Galtung and
Ruge (1965), remains an excellent conceptual guide to these criteria.
It bears repeating that the selection criteria employed by journalists
to decide what's news closely resemble the heuristic devices that people
use every day to make sense of their world. Thus, one could argue that
although news is indeed a product of relatively superficial judgments,
those judgments bear a close resemblance to decisions that most folks
make about what deserves their time and attention. In that sense, then,
journalistic decision making may mirror the priorities of the culture
within which it is embedded. We all love to hate our local newspaper
or our local TV news team. But there's a good chance that, given the
Cinderella opportunity to trade places with a reporter for a day, we'd
make our news selections in ways quite similar to those of our ridiculed
journalistic colleagues.
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Sifting and Winnowing the Evidence
Deciding what's news is only a start, however. Topic in hand, the
journalist must turn that topic into an actual story; she or he must decide what that story is about. That decision involves not only selecting
the narrative focus of a story - its angle - but also selecting sources,
gathering information from them, and then deciding how to represent
that information in the story itself. Such decisions can be extremely complex. But once again, the speed of the journalistic process requires that
reporters opt for an array of judgmental shortcuts. We have selected a
few judgmental shortcuts from the panoply to illustrate our point.

Objectivity. One of the frustrations of journalism is that, although it is
given the responsibility of "covering" the world around it and helping
citizens to make reasoned choices about that world, it can rarely determine what's true. Both the speed of production and the occupation's
tendency to eschew specialized training make it extremely difficult for
a reporter to have either the time or the skill to evaluate competing truth
claims. Thus, there is some chance that what becomes news may simply
not be true.
Journalists have adopted a couple of heuristics to handle this validity problem and the social criticism that accompanies it. Objectivity is
one. The practice of objectivity rewards a journalist not for figuring out
what's true but, in the absence of such analysis, for accurately reflecting
the voices of others. If you can't tell if someone is telling the truth, in
other words, at least you can make sure that you are accurately transmitting the person's message.
The cold fusion story is a good example of this heuristic in action.
Many science writers doubted the validity of the two scientists' claim, in
1989, that they had achieved room-temperature fusion. But these journalists were in no position to render a definitive judgment about the
truth of that claim. Thus, they felt they had no choice but to cover the
claim and to concentrate on reproducing it as accurately as possible.
Achieving objectivity in the cold fusion debate, in other words, was
good journalism.
lhis heuristic offers a number of advantages for reporters. Even specialists in a field understand the difficulty of making and defending
validity judgments. Science, for example, is replete with challenges to
validity; there is rarely a consensus on what's true. 1n such a climate, it
would be disastrous for less specialized individuals to try to ascertain
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the truth, as their judgments would carry little credibility. An emphasis
on accuracy is thus much safer than an emphasis on validity.
But this privileging of accuracy can have negative consequences. Although a manageable gpal, objectivity has become a journalistic ritual
(Tuchman, 1972) that actually encourages journalists to eschew responsibility for making validity judgments. Journalistic training has never
included the kinds of systematic analytical tools that members of other
occupations often utilize for validity purposes. And those reporters who
actually attempt to make a distinction between more or less likely truth
claims often find themselves in a kind of no-man's land, bereft of support
from either their sources or their journalistic peers (see, e.g., Crewdson,
1993; Fragin, 1998).

Balancing Contrasting Accounts. A second heuristic that allows journalists to eschew validity judgments is the practice of balancing contrasting
points of view. Since many arenas contain competing truth claims, this
heuristic dictates that, in the absence of knowing what's true, a journalist should offer the audience the whole array of possible claims. Thus,
this judgmental shortcut asks journalists to be responsible for knowing
about the extent of variance in truth claims, not about the validity of
those claims.
Typically, this heuristic gets operationalized in a story by providing
two competing claims, each meant to demarcate a contrasting domain of
beliefs. So, for example, if a journalist is writing a story about one group
of scientists'claim to have found fossilized life in a Martian meteorite,
the reporter is responsible for seeking a point of view at the other end
of the belief continuum. The story is not complete, in other words, until
it contains comments by a scientist who is skeptical of the claim.
Again, this heuristic encourages the journalist to accomplish a manageable evidentiary task: identifying variance in rather than validity of
points of view. But the ritualistic practice of balance is often reduced to
selecting points of view situated at the ends of a belief continuum and
then giving those (sometimes rather extreme) beliefs equal space.
interestingly, journalists continue to endorse the concept of balance
even when they have some evidence suggesting that a belief is not true.
For example, Dearing (1995) examined coverage of three controversial
science issues that featured less than believable assertions offered by individuals considered to be scientific mavericks. One was the 1989 cold
fusion announcement. The second was the claim by a self-trained climatologist, in 1990, that there was a SO-SO chance that a severe earthquake
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(the so-called New Madrid quake, which never occurred) would shake
the lower Midwest by a specific date. And the third was a well-known
biologist's long-running assertion that the human immunodeficiency
virus (HN) virus cannot be the cause of acquired immune deficiency
syndrome (AIDS).
Dearing found that, in all three cases, despite the fact that journalists
believed the extreme claims were wrong, they not only included these
claims in their stories but also, in the interest of balance, provided the
information in ways that lended legitimacy to them. Thus, he argued,
balancing truth claims sent the message to readers that these scientific
mavericks were as likely to be right as the mainstream scientific sources
on the other side of the issue.

Preference for the Vivid Anecdotal Account. Psychologists argue that most
people prefer to make inferences on the basis of vivid anecdotal information rather than utilizing systematic or consensus data (Nisbett &
Ross, 1980). That is, we opt for the concrete over the abstract.
This heuristic tendency is exacerbated in journalism. Journalistic training expressly privileges self-reported data by encouraging reporters to
gather information in face-ta-face interview settings. Systematic data
are relegated to the position of backup information, available to flesh
out a story but not intended as primary information on which a story
can be hung. And when systematic data are indeed the focal point of
a story - as is often the case when journalists are writing about newly
published scientific research - reporters will often seek out anecdotal
information to make the story more "readable."
For example, when a scientific study some years ago suggested a
relationship between drinking coffee and the risk of pancreatic cancer,
the research made front-page headlines around the country. But many
journalists felt the need for a more vivid, concrete dimension to the tale.
Some asked the researchers about any changes they might have made in
their own coffee-drinking habit as a result of the study. Others went to
locations such as restaurants to confer with coffee drinkers about their
reactions to the study (Ryan, Dunwoody, & Tankard, 1991).
This focus on the anecdotal has a distinct storytelling advantage.
Audiences are more likely to get caught up in vivid personal stories
than in accounts that rely only on systematic data gathering. But there
is a risk that both journalist and audience will mistake the personal
tale as a marker for a larger pattern. We tum to that possibility in the
following case study about an event in Wisconsin that offered journalists
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both anecdotal and systematic data. The resulting media coverage of
the state's attempt to introduce reformulated gas into daily use serves
as a useful illustration of the kinds of heuristic devices popular among
joumalists.
The Reformulated Gas Controversy in Wisconsin
As a consequence of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, gasoline stations in certain urban corridors of the United States have been
required by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to sell a
reformulated gas mixture designed to cut down significantly on the levels of automobile-related smog. The additives in reformulated gas are
ethyl- or ether-based compounds, chief among them methyl tertiarybutyl ether (MTBE).
The Milwaukee area, a large urban regjon in Wisconsin on the shores
of Lake Michigan, was one of the metropolitan areas required to use
reformulated gas, and Milwaukee gas stations began selling the fuel in
late fall 1994. Local media reports in early 1995 fueled a growing awareness of the gas, and people began contacting state and federal offices to
complain that pumping reformulated gas was making them sick. Calls
eventually mounted into the thousands. Wisconsin finally directed i\s
state epidemiologists to conduct an investigation of the possible health
·impacts of reformulated gas, a study that was completed in June 1995
(Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, 1995).
We became interested in media coverage of this controversy because
the issue confronted joumalists with a challenging array of evidence.
On the one hand, the early stages of the issue were dominated by vivid
anecdotal testimonials. Individuals who felt that they had become ill
from exposure to the gas contacted govemmental officials and media
organizations to complain and demand redress. Even the state's governor got into the act, eventually traveling to Washington, DC, to urge the
U.S. EPA to renege on its requirement that Milwaukee area motorists
use reformulated gas, a plea that was ultimately unsuccessful.
But although all this anecdotal information conveyed the perception
that reformulated gas was causing problems such as nausea and flulike
symptoms, the state's investigation of those claims offered systematic
data that painted a very different picture. The state's study was conducted in four parts:
1. Researchers monitored the air near the pumps dispensing reformulated gas to see if substances to which individuals were
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exposed were any more toxic than normal (any gasoline is made
of a soup of chemicals, some of which are linked to cancer).
2. They contacted the health departments of other states using
reformulated gas to learn if these other locations were also experiencing health disruptions.
3. They compared the composition of the reformulated gas being pumped in Milwaukee with that of reformulated gas elsewhere.
4. Finally, researchers conducted a random digit dial phone survey to compare the rate of occurrence and correlates of health
complaints in three areas: metropolitan Milwaukee; metropolitan Chicago, where reformulated gas also was in use; and other
regions of Wisconsin where reformulated gas was not available.
State epidemiologists found that a much greater proportion of
Milwaukee gasoline users reported becoming ill than did those surveyed in other areas, including Chicago, where the same type of reformulated gas was being used. But neither the availability of reformulated
gas nor the chemical constituents of the gas in Milwaukee predicted
the illness reports. Rather, the state found that the best predictors of
the likelihood of feeling ill were (1) having had a cold or the flu and
(2) an awareness of the possibility that reformulated gas might be a
health threat. To put that latter predictor in a more colorful context, media coverage of the reformulated gas controversy was making people
sick.
Once the systematic data became available in September 1995, we
asked: How would Milwaukee media organizations cope with the array
of evidence now available to them? The reformulated gas issue was certainly news, as it had led to local TV newscasts several times earlier in
the winter, when anecdotal evidence poured in about the possible health
effects. So the new epidemiological study would be readily defined as
newsworthy. But would meclia organizations continue to privilege the
earlier anecdotal accounts in the face of strong evidence that Milwaukee
residents were not becoming ill from exposure to reformulated gas?
And, given the existence of carefully gathered, systematic data, would
journalists still feel the need to balance the findings of state epidemiologists with information skeptical of the new information?
To answer these questions, we videotaped the reformulated gas news
stories aired by the three Milwaukee television stations for several days
after release of the state epidemiological report. We also attended to
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stories written by journalists working for The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel,
the city's daily newspaper. (A more detailed analysis of these findings
is available in Trumbo, Dunwoody, & Griffin, 1998.)

Preference for the Vivid
Although all news organizations began their stories with the announcement that the state's study had found no health effects that could
be linked to the use of reformulated gas, reporters typically headed to
nearby gas stations to ask individuals for their reactions to that news.
Ultimately, those anecdotal interviews took up equal or more time in the
stories than did reporters'efforts to explain the study's findings. Thus,
it was clear that journalists did not feel that the systematic evidence
could stand on its own; they needed to either bolster or contradict it
with anecdotal accounts.
But another possible indicator of the power of the anecdotal account
lay in the obvious skepticism that journalists brought to the state's
findings. Recall that journalists had been bombarded for months by
individual testimonials of illness, a pattern reinforced by actions of
state officials to convince the U.s. EPA to ban reformulated gas in the
state. Confronted with a systematic study that debunked the causeand-effect assertions, many journalists reacted cautiously, even skeptically.
For example, when an anchor at one of the Milwaukee television
stations introduced a story about the survey findings by saying, "The
state says the facts are in and the new gas we are required to use is
not a health problem," her coanchor responded: "Not a health problem?
Thousands of people have complained about the reformulated gasoline, saying it makes them sick" (from transcript in Trumbo et. aI., 1998,
p. 257).
Another anchor, after sitting through an account of the epidemiological findings, ended the news segment by remarking: "Makes you
wonder if 15,000 [sic] people could all be wrong" (from transcript in
Trumbo et al., 1998, p. 262).
Yet another station embedded the skepticism in its lead-in for the
story. Said the anchors: "While it runs your car, will it ruin your health?
A new report on reformulated gas says no. [The two anchors identify
themselves.] Butsome people are still hesitant to reformulate an opinion
on that gas" (from transcript in Trumbo et aI., 1998, p. 258).
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One possibility is that reporters had found the earlier anecdotal evidence persuasive, making it difficult for them to interpret the new,
systematic data as offering a higher-quality interpretation of reality.
Stocking and Gross (1989), in a monograph that examines cognitive bias
in news making, reflect on how reporters - like all folks - tend to adopt
a set of beliefs and then define subsequent information that supports
their original theory as more valid than information that doesn't. In this
case, the state survey stood in stark contrast to the anecdotal accounts,
making it easy prey to those reporters who had become convinced by
the earlier accounts of health problems.

The Persistence of Balance
If reporters indeed were reacting warily to the new study resuits,
that wariness would have reinforced occupational pressure to balance
the study findings with points of view that contradicted it. And that's
what we found in the television reports. The epidemiological study was
never allowed to stand unchallenged. Rather, journalists worked to find
points of view from the other side of the continuum. Some journalists
went seeking comments from the state's governor, who had earlier gone
on the record as opposing the use of reformulated gas in the state. (The
governor, inCidentally, reacted with "no comment.") Others gave space
to a congressperson who, inexplicably, railed against the validity of using survey research to accomplish the ends sought by the study.
In the most extreme instance of balancing, a reporter from one of the
stations learned that a scientist asked to evaluate the state's study as
part of a consensus panel had refused to endorse the study's conclusion
that it had found no link between reformulated gas and reported health
problems. The reporter tracked down the researcher, put him on the air,
and literally badgered him into dissenting:
Reporter voice over: Just [an] hour and a half ago, in a satellite interview from

Raleigh, (name) told me he never signed off on the study because, he said,
it's riddled with problems. (Cut to side-by-side shots of the reporter and the
scientist.)
Scientist: You simply can' t make that statement ...
Reporter: The study is flawed, is what you're saying, the study is flawed.
Scientist: Well, the study ... yea, the study's got a lot of problems, too .. . (cut off
mid-sentence). (From transcript in Trumbo et ai., 1998, p. 260)
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And Now for Something Completely Different
A very different account of the state's findings appeared in The
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. Written by the environmental reporter, Don
Behm (1995), the story clearly privileged the epidemiological work over
the earlier anecdotal accounts. In fact, it included no anecdotal material
at all, concentrating instead on explainirtg the study's goals. and methods and reflecting the views of a variety of individuals regarding the
meaning of the findings.
Efforts to balance contrasting viewpoints were also missing from this
story. A reader would have to have made it to the very bottom of the story
(which by this time has "jumped" to an inside page) to learn that some
individuals were taking issue with the state's study. The story offered
a one-sentence critique by a Wisconsin congress person who referred
to the study as "bogus." In this account, then, heuristic strategies that
dominated other accounts were abandoned.
What lies behind the rather dramatic difference between the newspaper and television accounts? One possibility is differential production
stresses. In addition to its insatiable need for visuals, television can be
more physically demanding than a daily newspaper. For example, television reporters may have to package the same issue two or three times
in a given day (the noon, early evening, and late evening news shows),
so time may be even more scarce than at the typical newspaper. When
time is scarce, heuristic devices blossom.
A second possible factor accounting for the variance is reporter expertise. Years of reporting on complex environmental issues have enabled
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel reporter Don Behm to become more adept at
systematic evaluation of evidence. Specialty reporters, who can spend
entire careers covering a particular information domain, are among the
few reporters who are encouraged to develop in-depth knowledge. But
specialty beats are rare in television - certainly at the local level, where
reporters are few and equipment cost~ are high. Thus, most TV reporters
are generalists, unable to develop expertise and rewarded, instead, for
speed and reliability.
The reformulated gas story is a case study in how journalists may
mistake anecdotal evidence as markers of larger patterns. This is a familiar cycle for all of us, from the scientist who has an unpleasant experience with a journalist and concludes that all journalists are bad to the
employer who insists that she can determine the potential of an applicant on the basis of an interview alone. In the course of coverage of the
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reformulated gas controversy, it is possible that Milwaukee television
journalists readily defined anecdotal evidence as reflections of a larger
pattern, that they interpreted the many public complaints about the
health repercussions of pumping reformulated gas as sufficient evidence
of a cause-and-effect relationship. Their skeptical reactions to the subsequent state epidemiological study certainly bolster this interpretation.
Discussion

In this chapter we have put forward an argument on behalf of journalism
as an occupation that has institutionalized heuristic decision making.
Without the ability to make extremely quick decisions, daily journalism
as we know it could not exist. Although some components of the journal·ism world - magazines, television and radio documentaries, nonnews
sections of newspapers - allow reporters to be more reflective, the bulk
of what counts as journalism demands split-second decisions.
To accommodate this fact of life, journalism has commandeered a
host of garden-variety judgmental shortcuts and made them its own.
Although some have been given occupational labels - the use of news
values, for instance, or the concept of objectivity - they function within
the occupation in ways quite similar to their use in daily life.
That resonance with daily practice may be one of the reasons that
journalism has evolved to play such an important role in human culture. We may rely on journalistic accounts not because they are of high
quality in an evidentiary sense but because journalists think like us. News
choices validate our own priorities. Journalists'search for cause and effect parallels our own. It is culturally reassuring to see such consonance
out and about in the land.
Policymakers, too, have picked up on that social consonance. They
are among the most intense users of media information not only to keep
abreast of the behaviors of other policymakers (Price, 1992) but also,
presumably, to take advantage of the tendency of mass media channels
to mirror common cultural judgmental processes. To that extent, then,
the kinds of heuristic judgments reflected in media accounts provide
valuable clues for policymakers about popular ways of thinking.

The Problems with "Thinking Like Us"
But the tendency of journalists to rely on shortcut decision-making
strategies is also problematic, for at least a couple of reasons. First,
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consumers and policymakers tend to believe that news stories indeed
reflect the more important social occurrences in our environment. Although we may have smiled when Walter Cronkite signed off his newscast each evening with "Well, that's the way it is" back in the 1960s and
1970s, we believed him! one of the most important functions of journalistic work seems to be its role in legitimating some forms of reality over
others.
By way of illustration, a group of sociologists (Phillips, Kanter,
Bednarczyk, & Tastad, 1991) tested the legitimizing ability of media
coverage on a very difficult audience indeed: scientists. The scholars
isolated two groups of research reports from the prestigious Nw England Journal of Medicine that differed on one important variable: One
group of studies had generated stories in the Nw York Times and the
other group had not. The SOCiologists controlled for a host of other confounding variables and then looked at how frequently the studies got
cited in the scientific literature in the ensuing years.
To their astonishment, those studies that got Nl!w York Times attention received 73% more citations in the peer-reviewed literature than
did the equally good but less publicly visible studies. The investigators
concluded that the New York Times was playing a role in establishing the
importance and legitimacy of particular research efforts even for other
specialists within these scientists'own fields .
. Admittedly, few media organizations have the legitimizing clout of
the Nw York Times. But even Times reporters must rely on judgmental
shortcuts to select those topiCS to which they will attend, to make judgments about sources, and the like. Thus, relatively superficial heuristics may playa disproportionate role in constructing reality for media
consumers.
Policymakers seem to fall prey to this legitimizing function of the
media just as easily as do other inhabitants of American culture. Although the ability of the mass media to help establish public notions of
what's important has been amply demonstrated across time and topic,
evidence grows that media content may have even more powerful effects on policymakers'agendas. For example, in one study of the agendasetting influence of mass media coverage of global warming during
the 1980s and early 199Os, Trumbo (1995) found that media accowlts
had little influence on lay audiences' judgments of the importance of
this environmental topic but profoundly affected policymakers' judgments. Even more interesting, the effect formed a kind of feedback loop:
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Actions by policymakers produced media stories, which in turn served
as catalysts for further policy action.
A second possible debit of the ubiquity of shortcut decision making in
daily journalism is that journalistic practices may encourage heuristic
thinking among members of the audience. It is likely that we all utilize judgmental shortcuts for most decision-making needs. But we are
routinely enjoined to resort to systematic thinking whenever possible,
certainly when important decisions loom. Confronted with a complicated medical situation, we are urged to seek a second opinion . Faced
with a long but somewhat unpredictable earnings life, we are advised
to learn about different kinds of savings options and to make multivariate plans for a secure economic future. Information processing that
·seeks and evaluates altematives is difficult, however. And most of us
are, quite simply, bad at it.
Although journalism exists ostensibly to help individuals make reasoned decisions about the world around them, the heuristic base that
buttresses the business offers up to information consumers the same
kinds of judgmental shortcuts to which those consumers themselves
may fall prey. Thus, a search for information that includes a heavy reliance on media accounts may reinforce individuals in their own hurried heuristic habits. The confluence of a complex medical situation and a
newspaper story about it may encourage a reader to contact the medical
center featured in the story, no questions asked. Similarly, an individual
at sea regarding her financial future may latch onto a financial adviser
whose ad appears in a local magazine. From such heuristic judgments
is the edifice of advertising built.
When policymakers encounter topics in the news that are near and
dear to their hearts, we would expect those individuals to be more resistant to the potential media reinforcement of heuristic thinking strategies. Although policymakers are indeed heavy users of mass media,
they come to these channels with well-developed belief systems about
specific topics and issues. Such belief systems make individuals more
likely to be information cOlls/rue/ors than information ingesters. That is,
such persons are less likely to be influenced by message content than
they are to "rewrite" that content to fit their prevailing mental maps.
On the other hand, when policymakers encounter media information
for which they don't have well-developed beliefs, they may be subject to
the same reinforcement effect that may bedevil the public itself. That is,
they may naively conclude that if it's in the newspaper, it must be true.
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Effecting Change
Although daily journalism is unavoidably an occupation dominated
by heuristic judgments, occupants of other journalistic niches may have
the time and resources to think more systematically and make more
careful decisions about who and what. Magazine articles, broadcast documentaries, and newspaper series are often the product of weeks or
months of thought, reflection, information gathering, and writing. Journalists who are equipped to view the world more systematically should
be able to flourish in these modes.
But are journalists so equipped? Whereas the typical journalist of
19th- and early-20th-<:entury America entered the occupation via an
apprenticeship system, today's journalists increasingly get their basic
training in university journalism programs (Weaver and Wilhoit, 1996).
Those programs urge on their students a bifurcated education: On the
one hand, the programs work to instill basic professional skills and values; on the other, they push their young charges to attain a traditional
liberal arts education. A typical ratio of coursework would be one skills
course to every two or three courses elsewhere in the university.
Unfortunately, neither of those educational goals gives young journalists systematic information processing skills in today's university.
Most schools fail either to define such skills as part of an individual's
b~sic competencies or, even if they do identify the ability to process information systematically as an important tool, to offer courses that give
students basic training in it. Journalisrn courses are no different.
This means that journalists will continue to make relatively superficial judgments about the world around them. Most of those judgments will be reasonably good ones, and we information consumers
will be well served, all told. But the business of journalism is simply n ot
equipped to tum a sustained, systematic eye to an issue in ways that
illuminate that issue's basic assumptions. As one historian put it many
years ago, journalism is "history on the run." A dead run does not offer
a good venue for systematic thinking.
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